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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TRAYLOR BROTHERS, INC.,
FRUNIN-COLNON AND COMMERCIAL
UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Defendants/Appellants,

Case No. 860460
Industrial Commission No.
85000089 & 85000724

vs.
DARRELL W. OVERTON and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

(Argument Priority No. 6)

Applicants/Respondents.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Was

the Industrial Commission correct in concluding that

the applicant, Darrell W. Overton, was injured
industrial

accident

compensation

which

entitled

benefits, without

a

him
15%

to

in a compensable
his

reduction

full award of
of

benefits

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-14•
More specifically, the issue may be stated as follows: Given
the

facts

and

circumstances

of

this

case,

is

§35-1-14

U.C.A. applicable such that an award of benefits may be reduced by
15%?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
§35-1-84. Furnishing and certifying proceedings and transcript to Supreme Court—Power of
court to affirm or set aside award—Grounds
for setting aside.—Upon the filing of the
action for review the court shall direct the
commission to furnish and certify to the
Supreme Court,
within
twenty
days, all
proceedings and the transcript of evidence
taken in the case, and the matter shall be
determined upon the record of the commission

as certified by it.
Upon such review the
court may affirm or set aside such award, but
only upon the following grounds:
1)
That the commission acted
excess of its powers;
2)
That the
the award.

without or in

findings of fact do not support

§35-1-85. Duty of commission to make findings
of fact
and conclusions of l a w — F i l i n g —
Conclusiveness on questions of fact—Review—
Court judgment.—After each formal hearing, it
shall be the duty of the commission to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in
writing and file the same with its secretary.
The findings and conclusions of the commission
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and
final and shall nob be subject to review; such
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts
and the
findings and conclusions of the
commission. The commission and every party to
the action or proceeding before the commission
shall have the right to appear in the review
proceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall
enter judgment either affirming or setting
aside the award.
§35-1-14. Penalty for failure to use safety
device.—Where injury is caused by the willful
failure of the employee to use safety devices
where provided by the employer, or from the
employee's willful failure to obey any order
or reasonable rule adopted by the employer for
the safety of the employee, or from the
intoxication of the employee, compensation
provided for herein shall be reduced fifteen
per cent, except in case of injury resulting
in death.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition by
the Industrial Commission.
This case

arises under

the Utah

Workers 1 Compensation Act.

The applicant, Darrell W. Overton filed an Application for Hearing
with the Industrial Commission of Utah on January
2

22, 1985

so as

to have

determined the

amount of

compensation benefits which he

was entitled to for compensable industrial
25.)

An

37.)

On May 13, 1986 an Order was

Judge

evidentiary hearing

Janet

benefits.

L. Moffit
More

was held

entitling

328.)

(R

Administrative Law

Judge

Moffit

held

that

(R 316 - 317.)

appellants moved

denial

of

the

for review

15%

of the Order,

reduction of benefits.

(R

The Industrial Commission denied the Motion for Review, and

they adopted

the Findings

Administrative Law Judge.
B.

4, 1985.

inapplicable in this case and therefore a 15%

On June 25, 1986
the

(R

Mr. Overton to a full award of

reduction of benefits was improper.

challenging

on December

entered by

specifically,

U.C.A. §35-1-14 was

injuries incurred.

of Fact

and Conclusions of Law of the

(R 345.)

Statement of Facts.
1.

Applicant,

Darrell

Overton

was

employed

by

Brothers, Inc. as an engineer in charge of survey work.
2.

went on

(R 42.)

Overton was not scheduled to work on August 16, 1983, but

he was on 24 hour-a-day call.
3.

Traylor

(R 52, 100.)

On August 16, 1983, at approximately 10:00
a picnic

with his family.

(R 50.)

the day Overton consumed 12 to 14 beers.

a.m., Overton

During the course of

He did not have anything

to drink after 6:30 p.m.
4.
crew

After

members

indicated

to

returning home
who

was

Overton

from the

scheduled
that

to work and was thinking about

he

to
was

picnic, one of Overton's
work

not

the

going to be able to go

quitting because
3

graveyard shift

of some problems

he was

having with

another supervisor•

situation, Overton agreed to

work the

Because of the emergency
graveyard shift

the crew member to have the night off.
5.

Overton

he charged

drove to

Duchesne to get

to his employer's account.

He also stopped

by Traylor Brothers office
calculator.
6.

truck and

to

pick

up

his

transit,

level and

(R 53, 54.)

After

picking up his equipment, Overton left for the job

site which was about 45 miles away.
7.

(R 52.)

slept from about 6;30 to 8:30 p.m. that evening.

He then got into the company
gas which

and allow

(R 55.)

Overton turned off of the main road onto a road which had

several large

potholes.

He

swerved to miss a pothole, and as he

did so, his vehicle struck a sandy portion of the road and he lost
control, which
55, 56.)
(R 59.)
8.

caused the

The accident

vehicle to roll at least one time.

cause significant

injury to Mr. Overton.

There were no witnesses to the accident.
After

the accident,

(R

(R 102.)

Overton had the presence of mind to

start the truck up again to drive himself back to Duchesne to seek
medical attention.
9.

(R 56, 57.)

When Overton reached Duchesne, he was stopped by a member

of the Sheriff's office, taken to

the police

with driving under the influence of alcohol.
10.

station and charged
(R 57.)

The "Investigating Officer's Report of Traffic Accident"

indicates the following:

The road

condition was

no street

dark with

road was curved.

The report

surface

further
4

lights.

was

wet.

The light

It was raining.

indicates

that

The

there were

circumstances11:

three "contributing

1)

speed too fast; 2) drove

left of center line; and 3) D.U.I, (alcohol).
11.
hour.

(R 335.)

Overton denies that he was traveling about

88 miles per

(R 96.)
12.

Overton

at

no

time

in the proceedings conceded that

there should be a 15% reduction in the benefits he was to receive.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
U.C.A. §35-1-14 allows

an

employer

to

reduce compensation

benefits payable by 15% if the employee's injury was caused by his
intoxication.
was

The Industrial Commission

inapplicable

in

the

case

at

bar

held

that

because

this statute
the employee's

intoxication was not willful, nor was it the cause of the injury.
The Industrial Commission's decision
tion in

benefits was not arbitrary or capricious.

a decision reasonably reached on
record.

denying the

Because

the

basis

of

15% reduc-

Rather, it was
evidence

in the

the decision was a reasoned one with evidence in

support thereof, it is not subject to remand by this Court.
U.C.A. §35-1-14 implies that the intoxication of the employee
must be

willful to

Mr. Overton's

warrant a 15% reduction in benefits.

intoxication

was

not

willful,

this

Because

statute

is

inapplicable and the benefits awarded may not be reduced.
Even if this Court concludes that the employee's intoxication
need not

be willful

§35-1-14 is
was

not

the

to warrant

a reduction

in benefits, U.C.A.

still inapplicable because Mr. Overton's intoxication
proximate

cause

of

injuries.
5

his

accident

and consequent

The

issue

of

reduction

of

benefits

pursuant

to

U.C.A.

§35-1-14 was before the Industrial Commission necessarily, because
it is

a defense to applicant's claims for compensation.

inasmuch as this

is

an

affirmative

defense,

the

Further,

onus is upon

the employer to assert the defense and present evidence in support
thereof.

Traylor Brothers failed

to

present

such

evidence and

should be barred from doing so at a later date.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH
DENIED A 15% REDUCTION IN THE COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
AWARDED
TO
THE
APPLICANT,
MR. OVERTON, WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS,
WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE, OR WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND THEREFORE THE
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT BE
OVERTURNED.
The appellant in the case at bar contends that the Industrial
Commission

erred

in

concluding

that

the compensation benefits

which Mr. Overton is entitled to are not subject
tion.

Appellant

15% reduc-

- Traylor Brothers have petitioned this Court to

review the Commission's
1
benefits.
The standard

to a

Order

denying

a

15%

reduction

of the

of review which has been utilized by this Court

in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous
1.

U.C.A. §35-1-84 and §35-1-85 statutorily define the duty
of the commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the power of the Utah Supreme Court to
review these findings.
See text of these statutes supra at pp. 1 & 2.

6

cases which have articulated
the Utah

Supreme Court

the power

or scope

of review which

possesses with regard to decisions handed

down by the Industrial Commission.
One such case which clearly sets forth the proper standard is
Kaiser Steel

Corporation v. Monfredi,

631 P.2d

888 (Utah 1981).

In Kaiser the Court stated:
Under any of these standards . . . it is
apparent
that
this
Court's function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a
strictly limited one in which the question is
not whether the
Court
agrees
with the
Commission's findings or whether they are
supported by the preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing court's inquiry is
whether
the
Commission's
findings
are
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable]
conclusion from
the evidence" to support
them.
Only then
should
the Commissions
findings be displaced. 631 P.2d at 890.
Another case

which addressed the issue of this Court's scope

of review is Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256
(Utah 1980):
When the Commission remains unpersuaded on a
question of fact, this Court does not disagree
therewith and compel such a finding unless the
evidence is such that all reasonable minds
would so find, and the court would thus so
rule as a matter of law. On the contrary, if
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
(or lack of evidence) such that reasonable
minds acting
fairly thereon could remain
unpersuaded, this Court does not upset the
determination made.
606 P.2d at 258, 259.
See also the very recent case of Hodges v. Western Piling and
Sheeting Company, 717 P.2d 718, 720 (Utah 1986) wherein this Court
stated, "In

reviewing questions

of fact,
7

this Court gives great

deference to the Commission's

findings. Only

where the findings

are without foundation in the evidence will the court reverse."
Accordingly, applying

the above-cited

at bar, the Supreme Court is powerless to
Commission's

order

unless

it

can

be

authority to the case
overturn the Industrial

said that based upon the

entire record, the Industrial Commission clearly acted arbitrarily
and capriciously

in denying

a 15%

reduction of the benefits due

Mr. Overton.
An

examination

Commission did

of

the

record

makes

it

clear

that

the

not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining

the propriety of a 15% reduction of the

benefits due,

and there-

fore the order must stand.
The Commission

(adopting the

findings of the Administrative

Law Judge) found that there was no proof
control of

his vehicle

the Commission

the

cation was the
injuries.
to

intoxication

of

was

the
in

hand,

if

there

to

Commission,
fact

an

applicant lost
That is to say,
issue

of fact.

left unpersuaded that intoxiaccident

and consequent

Martinson, in order for this court

the

and

cause

requisite that all reasonable minds
other

as

Mr. Overton's

according to

with
was

unpersuaded

Commission

cause

Thus,

disagree

because of intoxication.

remained

Specifically,

that the

appears

to

compel
of

would

the
so

a

finding that

accident,

conclude.

it is
On the

be a reasonable basis in the

evidence (or lack thereof) such that reasonable minds could remain
unpersuaded that

intoxication caused Mr. Overton's accident, then

it is not within this

Court's

power
8

to

upset

the Commission's

determination.
Therefore, it

becomes necessary to scrutinize the record and

discern whether or not the Commission's findings have a reasonable
foundation in

the evidence.

that a reasonable mind
intoxication caused

If the record reveals evidence such

could conclude

that something

other than

the accident, then this Court is powerless to

reverse the Commission's order.
An examination
Traffic Accident"
may have caused or

of

the

"Investigating

Officer's

Report of

indicates that there are numerous factors which
contributed to

the accident.

(R 335.)

This

report shows that at the time of the accident the road surface was
wet and the

light

condition

was

dark

with

no

street lights.

Further, it was raining at the time of the accident; and the "road
character" was defined
identified

the

as

following

The

investigating officer

three factors as "contributing circum-

stances" to the accident:
center; and

"curved".

1) speed too fast; 2) drove left of the

3) alcohol. Of these three circumstances, "speed too

fast" was labeled as the "prime contributor".
In addition to the
testimony in

aforementioned accident

report, there is

the record which indicates that something other than

intoxication may have been the cause of the accident.
testified that

the road

on which

he was

driving contained many

large potholes, and it was the avoidance of one of
which

caused

Overton

to

lose

Further, Overton testified that
was not

control
at the

feeling the effects of alcohol.
9

Mr. Overton

of

these potholes

the truck.

time of
(R 57.)

(R 56.)

the accident, he
Inasmuch as the

alcohol which Overton had consumed was consumed over the course of
an entire

day, coupled

with the

fact that

liquor in the three hours immediately
is

reasonable

to

Mr. Overton's blood

assume
was

that

not

he had not drunk any

preceding the
the

amount

significant

accident, it

of

enough

alcohol

to

in

impair his

driving so as to cause the accident.
Therefore, when the entire record is inspected - the investigating

officer's

accident

Overton's testimony

other variables

the accident.

in the evidence such
conclusion as

taken

in

conjunction

with

- it is certainly reasonable to conclude that

perhaps one of the
cause of

report,

(other than

Thus, because there is a reasonable basis

that reasonable

did the

alcohol) was the

minds could

reach the same

Commission, the findings are not arbitrary

and capricious, and therefore are not subject to

being displaced.

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN
CONCLUDING THAT §35-1-14 U.C.A. IMPLIES THAT
WILLFUL CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE EMPLOYEE IS
NECESSARY IN ORDER TO WARRANT A 15% REDUCTION
IN BENEFITS AWARDED TO THE EMPLOYEE.
Appellant contends
at

the

time

applicable.

of

the

that because
accident,

Respondents

maintain that this statute
tion be

of a

reduction.

take

Mr. Overton was intoxicated

§35-1-14

exception

implies that

willful nature

before his

U.C.A. necessarily is
to

this reasoning and

the employee's intoxicabenefits are subject to

Accordingly, it is respondent's position

Mr. Overton's

intoxication

did

cause the accident (a contention

which respondents strongly refute) the intoxication
10

that even if

was not

of a

willful character

and therefore

§35-1-14 is inapplicable and the

compensation benefits may not be reduced.
In
v. Kaiser

support

of

Steel

appellant's

Corp.,

claimant appealed from a
reducing
15%.

the

amount

660

of

in a

P.2d

decision
his

This Court held that

accident resulting

contention,
250
of

they

(Utah

the

cite

1983).

Lopez

In Lopez,

Industrial Commission

workmen's compensation benefits by

pursuant

to

§35-1-14

U.C.A.,

if an

claimant's compensable injury was due to

claimant's intoxication, compensation benefits

are to

be reduced

by 15%.
Lopez however, may clearly be distinguished from the case at
bar and is not
Court.

dispositive

Referring

to

of

Lopez,

the

issue

appellants

presently
state,

before the

"In citing the

pertinent part of §35-1-14, this court did not include any mention
that the intoxication must be willful."
A reasonable

(Appellant's Brief p. 9.)

explanation as to why the court did not include

any mention as to whether or not the intoxication must be willful,
is because that was not an issue in the case. Lopez was concerned
not with the willfulness of the intoxication, but

rather with the

causal relationship between the accident and the intoxication.
Although there are no reported Utah cases which have examined
the narrow issue of whether

or

not

the

claimant's intoxication

need be willful to warrant a reduction in benefits, Van Waters and
Rogers v. Workman, 700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985) provides some insight
regarding the
an

employer's

parameters of
action

§35-1-14 U.C.A.

seeking

to
11

set

Van Waters involved

aside

an

order

of the

Industrial

Commission

denying

compensation benefits
industrial

him

payable

accident.

to

Employer

a 15% reduction in workmen's
claimant

contended

willfully failed to use safety goggles
and that

a

that

provided by

result
his

of an

employee

his employer,

the 15% reduction set out in §35-1-14 U.C.A. should have

been imposed.
the

as

15%

While the pertinent part of this statute allows for

reduction

if

"[the]

injury

failure of the employee

to use

safety devices

the employer

. . .", this

700

deliberate

P.2d at 1098-1099.

employee was provided with a pair
exceptional circumstances
determining whether
reduced, the

or

caused by the willful
where provided by

Court held that the proper standard to

be employed is "willful and
requirement."

is

in

the

Court interpreted

defiance

of the

That is, in Van Waters the

of safety

he decided
not

and

goggles, and

due to

not to use the goggles. In

employee's

benefits

should be

the statute so that an employee's

benefits will not be reduced unless his "willful failure" actually
amounts to

something greater than mere "willful". The failure on

the part of

the

employee

must

defiance of the requirement.
language

yields

benefits will

equitable

not be

the statute

willful,

deliberate

and in

This interpretation of the statutory
results

reduced if

for failing to comply.
tion of

be

Such an

inasmuch

as

he has a reasonable explanation
interpretation is

because a

purpose behind

maintenance of safety in the work

the employee's

place -

not in deroga-

the statute - the

is furthered.

opinion, the Van Waters Court cited with approval 1A.
Workmen's Compensation, §33.40:
12

A.

In its
Larson,

If the employee had some plausible purpose to
explain his violation of a rulef the defense
of violation of safety
rules or willful
misconduct are inapplicable, even though the
judgment of employee might have been faulty or
his conduct rash.
700 P.2d at 1099.
The rationale
case at bar.
in favor

of Van

Waters is

In Van Waters the Court liberally construed §35-1-14

of fully compensating the employee, thereby achieving an

equitable result. The court
stances may

arise such

safety rule is excused
should
deals

hold
with

true
an

al circumstances

recognized that

and full

with

regard

employee's

benefits are

awarded.

The same

to the portion of §35-1-14 which

intoxication.

There

are exception-

which arise such that it would be inequitable to
due

to

exceptional circumstance

in the

mere

employee intoxication.

is present

That circumstance being - the claimant
cated while

exceptional circum-

that an employee's failure to adhere to a

reduce a claimants benefits
Such an

certainly applicable to the

was not

in the case at bar.
willfully intoxi-

course of his employment. While the claimant

may have been intoxicated, it was not his desire or plan to engage
in

employment

while

intoxicated.

Rather,

in

this incidence,

Mr. Overton was drinking on his time off and came in
because

an

emergency

required

his

presence

Overton had no foreknowledge that he was going
come in

and work,

at

to work only
the job site.

to be

required to

nor could it have reasonably been anticipated.

Further, after Overton learned that he was to work on the night in
question, he refrained from drinking any intoxicants.
Thus, just as in Van Waters wherein there existed exceptional
13

circumstances
safety

excusing

device,

there

an

employee's

exist

willful

exceptional

failure to use a

circumstances

case which should excuse Overton's intoxication.

in this

When an employer

requires an employee to be on 24 hour a day call, it is reasonable
to assume that the employer extends the scope of his risk and must
take the employee
Overton's

as

he

intoxication

finds

was

him

not

in

defiance of his employment duties.
able

explanation

for

being

when

an

emergency arises.

disregard of safety, nor in

Rather, Overton had

intoxicated

at

a reason-

work;

he

did

not

was not

anticipating working until he was sober.
Accordingly,
disregard

of

would

unjust

be

inasmuch

safety,

benefits which

and

as

his

the

applicant

act

in

fellow employees, or his employer, it

inequitable

to

reduce

Mr. Overton is entitled to.

the

compensation

He should receive the

full amount of benefits awarded.
POINT III
THE FACTS COMPEL A FINDING THAT MR. OVERTON'S
INJURIES WERE NOT CAUSED BY HIS INTOXICATION.
Regardless

of

whether

or not Mr. Overton's intoxication is

characterized as willful, for an employee's benefits to be reduced
pursuant to

§35-1-14 U.C.A.,

it is necessary that the employee's

intoxication was the proximate cause of the accident.
As stated by this
correct in

Court

in

Lopez

at

251:

"Plaintiff is

his assertion that there must be a causal relationship

between the accident and the

intoxication.

However,

factual determination best left to the Commission."
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this

is a

In

discussing

Court cited several
cited by

the

requisite causal relationship/ the Lopez

cases

from

other

jurisdictions.

One case

this Court in Lopez was Sztaba v. Great Northern Railway

Company, 411 P.2d 379 (Mont. 1966).

In Sztaba. the Court said:

The test most generally employed in determining causation
is the "but for" test.
. . . Proximate cause is one which in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new, independent cause,
produces the
injury, and without which the injury would not
have occurred. . . . At most, the "but for"
or "sine qua non" test is but one of exclusion. In other words, [a person's] conduct is
not the cause of the event, if the event would
have occurred without it.
411 P.2d at 385.
It necessarily follows

that

by

referring

to

Sztaba, this

Court has adopted a proximate cause, "but for" test to be utilized
in determining the causal relationship in cases such as the one at
bar.

This

approach is

A. Larson, Workmen's
states, "when

consistent with

Compensation,

the view

§34.33(a),

espoused in 1A
wherein

Larson

a statute says merely 'caused by' or 'due to', this

can refer neither to remote cause nor to sole cause.

It must mean

proximate cause."
Applying the above cited authority to the present case, it is
readily apparent that Overton's
cause of the accident.

intoxication was

not a proximate

This is so because there is ample evidence

in the record that indicates that the accident would have occurred
even if

Mr. Overton had

not been under the influence of alcohol.

Overton testified that his

avoidance of

15

a large

pothole was the

cause

of

his

accident.

The

indicates many other possible
road and

'Investigating
causes

weather conditions*

too fast' as being the prime

of

Officer's Report'

the

accident including

Further, this

report cites 'speed

contributor to

the accident. While

there is much credible evidence in the record to support a finding
that intoxication was not the cause of the accident, there appears
to be nothing in the record indicating that Overton's intoxication
was the cause thereof.
the employer

Inasmuch as

the burden

of proof

is upon

to establish

both the fact of intoxication and that
the injury was caused by the intoxication,2 it was proper for the
Commission to deny a 15% reduction of benefits.
Haller Beverage Corporation v. Department of Industry, Labor,
and Human Relations, 49
case which

is very

the

abutment.

the case

418 (1970)

at bar.

is a

The facts of

Elmer Walk was employed by Haller Beverage

in

southbound

There were

sample taken

NW 2d

a liquor salesman. While in the course of employ-

ment , he was killed
crossed

233f 181

analogous to

Haller are as follows:
Corporation as

Wis 2d

no

a

one-car

lane

of

witnesses

auto

accident

traffic
to

revealed .29% alcohol by

employer - Haller Beverage Corp. applied

and

the

when

his car

struck

a bridge

accident.

A blood

weight in the blood.
for

a

15%

The

decrease in

compensation payments, alleging that the deceased, at the time of
his deathf was intoxicated and that
such intoxication.
2.

his death

was the

result of

An administrative hearing was held, and it was

Haller Beverage Corporation v. Department of Industry,
Labor, and Human Relations, 49 Wis.2d 233, 181 NW 2d 418
(1970).
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determined that the deceased was probably intoxicated at
of the

accident/ but

that the employer failed to meet the burden

of proof that the fatal injury was the result of
reduction

of

the time

compensation

benefits

was

intoxication. A

not

allowed/

and the

employer appealed.
In affirming

the decision

disallowing a

reduction of bene-

fits/ the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
On the issue of intoxication/ the employer and
insurance carrier relied upon the .29% blood
test and expert testimony that a person with a
.29% alcohol by weight in the blood was
intoxicated. . . . On the issue as to causal
connection between intoxication and accident/
the employer and insurance carrier presented
no additional proof, by way of expert testimony or otherwise.
Instead they relied to
prove causation upon the absence of evidence
as
to
tire
blowout/ steering mechanism
failure/ deer crossing the road or other
distraction which might account for the car
hitting the bridge abutment.
In meeting a
burden of proof/ absence of testimony is not
the same as presence of testimony. It is time
that the employer and insurance carrier were
not required to negate all possible explanations of the car veering to hit the abutment.
But they were required to establish a causal
link between the condition of intoxication and
the injury.
This they did not do. Their
expert witness did not testify that the .29%
alcohol in the bloodf standing alone with no
corroborating physical evidence/ was the cause
of the car hitting the abutment.
181 NW 2d at 419/ 420.
Just as in Hallery
failed to

the

employer

want

the

present

case has

present any evidence establishing a causal link between

the employee's intoxication and
the

in

of

evidence

the injury

incurred.

Because of

showing the requisite causal relationship

between intoxication and injury,
17

the

Commission

was

correct in

concluding that

Overton's intoxication

was not

the cause of his

losing control of the vehicle,
Furthermoref as stated in
between

the

accident

and

Lopez, "[the]

the

intoxication

determination best left to the Commission."
inasmuch as
trary or
support

capricious, nor
it, the

overturned.
fails to
has a

the Commissions

. . . is a factual

660 P.2d at 251. And

factual determination
without

Commissions

any

was not arbi-

substantial

findings

evidence to

on this issue may not be

(See discussion at POINT I). That is, if an employer

convince the Industrial Commission, or if the Commission

reasonable

relationship

doubt

about

the

injury,

with

the

intoxication

then

it

is

Commission to deny a reduction in benefits due
is so

causal relationship

or

its causal

incumbent upon the
an employee.

This

because §35-1-14 recognizes that an employee may be intoxi-

cated and while in such condition receive an injury not

caused by

his intoxication.
See also Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers Inc., 97 Idaho 719,
552 P.2d 482, 485 (1976) wherein the court
the employee

may have

been drinking

does not necessarily establish that
time,

nor

does

a

finding

that

stated, "Evidence that

at the time of the accident
he

he

was

intoxicated

at that

was intoxicated lead to an

inevitable conclusion that the intoxication caused the accident."
See
Commission

also
of

Tatum

-

Colorado,

Reese
490

Development

Corp. v. Industrial

P.2d 94 (Colo. 1971) for a similar

holding.
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POINT IV
THE ISSUE OF REDUCTION OF BENEFITS PURSUANT TO
§35-1-14 U.C.A. WAS
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION; SAID
ISSUE IS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE WHICH MUST BE ASSERTED AND PROVED BY
DEFENDANT - EMPLOYER.
Appellants

claim

that

the

pursuant to §35-1-14 U.C.A. was
therefore

their

reduction

was

appellants

failure
justified

is

clearly

to

issue

of reduction of benefits

never before

present

and

evidence in support of the

excusable.

erroneous

the Commission/ and

as

This

the

contention

of

issue was necessarily

before the Commission from the outset.
In

support

Overton filed

of

appellants

contention/

they

statef

"When

for a hearing, he did so on the basis of continuing

temporary total disability.

Although

a

place

was

provided in

paragraph 5(D) on the Application for Overton to challenge the 15%
reduction/ he did not do so."
is not

(Appellant's Brief

pg. 12.)

This

altogether a correct statement. At best it is misleading.

On the Application For Hearing

form

which

appellants

refer tof

several reasons are given for the applicants filing of the claim:
5.

This

Claim

is

filed because:

[Please [X] appropriate

box]
A. [X]

Defendants

have

refused

payment

of

only

medical expenses.
B. [X]

Compensation

has

not

been paid for time off

work as shown in question 3

above.

[Question

3 refers to temporary total disability]
C. [X]

Defendants have denied liability for permanent
partial disability.
19

D. [ ]

Other reason

E.

I

am

.

claiming

benefits

. . . additional

[X]; additional

permanent

medical
partial

disability [X]. [R 25.]
Thus, it

appears that

Mr. Overton filed

for the purpose of obtaining temporary
but for

other reasons

also.

to determine the amount

of

his claim not only

total disability benefits,

He wanted the Industrial Commission

additional

medical

benefits

he was

entitled to, as well as compensation due for his permanent partial
disability.
It should be noted that the parties had never agreed to a 15%
reduction

of

benefits.

Further,

it

was not Overton's duty to

challenge any reduction of benefits.

Rather, the onus is upon the

defendant -

with any

employer to

go forward

evidence he has to

establish the affirmative defense of applicants intoxication.
Therefore, when Overton filed his Application
the

Industrial

Commission

was entitled to, any
necessarily an issue.

could determine what benefits Overton

defense to

this claim

for compensation was

However, for this issue to be determined in

favor of defendant - employer, it
present evidence

for Hearing so

in support

is necessary

that the employer

of his affirmative defense.

This he

did not do.

Inasmuch as it was defendants duty to come forth with

evidence in

support of

such evidence
granted an

is not

his position,
excusable, and

opportunity at

the failure to present any
he should

therefore not be

this time to present evidence which he

neglected to present at the appropriate time.
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Consistent

with

respondent

-

Overton's

position

is

1A

A, Larson, Workmen's Compensationy §34.31 at 6-92;
Since intoxication is an affirmative defense,
the burden of proof of intoxication and the
requisite degree
of causation is on the
employer, and when there is a conflict in the
evidence, a finding by the commission that
inebriation was not the cause of the accident
must be affirmed.
See

also

Nalley

v. Consolidated

Freightways,

Neb. 370f 282 NW 2d 47, 50 (1979) wherein

the court

Inc., 204

stated;. "And

finally, it is settled law that the burden of proof in a workmen's
compensation

case

on

the

defense

of

intoxication

is

on the

employer."
Also

see

United

States

Fidelity

Collins, 95 So.2d 456, 459 (Miss. 1957)
"Moreover, intoxication

and

Guaranty Company v.

in which

the court held,

is an affirmative defense with the burden

of proof upon the employer pleading it."
Appellants also

claim, "And

[appellant-employer] indicated

when testimony

on wages began,

that there was no dispute that the

benefits were to be reduced by 15%. Overton did not disagree.
42.)

Thus,

understanding

the

hearing

that

the

was
15%

(R

conducted

with

the

justifiable

reduction

was

not

at

issue."

(Appellant's Brief p. 13.)
While
there was

Overton's
no

attorney

dispute

did

regarding

a

not

expressly disagree that

reduction

in

benefits, the

applicant at no time in the proceedings conceded that there should
be a

15% reduction

attorney's response

in benefits
of "thank

he was

to receive. Applicant's

you" (R 42) was in response to the
21

judges indication to proceed
acknowledgment whatsoever

with questioning

that the

as opposed

to any

benefits should be reduced by

15%.
Further, because
between the

there

parties that

with the fact that
reduction this

was

no

understanding

the benefits

would be reduced, coupled

appellant's attorney

was an

issue properly

or agreement

made mention

of the 15%

before the

Court. And to

resolve this issue in favor of the employer, it is

requisite that

the employer present evidence in support of his position.

This he

neglected to do. To allow him to present evidence at a later time
would be inequitable and a miscarriage of justice.
CONCLUSION
In

denying

a

reduction

of

benefits

which are payable to

Mr. Overton, the Industrial Commission did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously, or

wholly without

cause. The record clearly shows

that Overton's intoxication was not
Appellant's

failure

to

present

the

cause

evidence

in

of

his accident.

support

of their

affirmative defense was neglect on their part, and they should not
be

allowed

to

present

respondents herein

evidence

respectfully

at a later date.
request

that

the

Accordingly,
Utah Supreme

Court affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission which denied a
reduction in benefits.
DATED this /

day of February, 1987.
BLACK & MOORE

/ & /

Susan B. Diana
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